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Abstract 
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two 
asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents clash in order to 
redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common 
contest models agents have the option of choosing a second instrument 
to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed 
to capture a complex bundle of Conflict Management Procedures 
(CMPs). Through comparative statics, different scenarios are studied. 
A Potential Settlement Region (PSR) is presented as the set of all 
possible settlement points. First, the role of asymmetry in the 
evaluation of the contested stake has been underlined. The agent with 
the lower evaluation will expend efforts in conflict management only 
when the asymmetry is extremely large. When agents are 
asymmetrical both in evaluation of the stake and in fighting abilities, 
there is also a smaller PSR. Once the destruction parameter is 
considered, agents clearly also take into account the opportunity cost 
of the conflict and enlarge a PSR. Finally, throughout the paper, the 
concept of entropy has been applied as a tool for the measurement and 
evaluation of conflict and conflict management. 
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CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT WITH INTERDEPENDENT 
INSTRUMENTS AND ASYMMETRIC STAKES 
 
(THE GOOD-COP AND THE BAD-COP GAME) 
 
 
I. Background of the Model 
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two 
asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents clash in order to redistribute a 
divisible stake in their favour. In recent economic literature, Jack Hirshleifer 
pioneered the work on modelling conflict, whose foundations are in 
Hirshleifer (1987, 1988, 1989). The economic theory of conflict1 rests to a 
large extent upon the assumption that agents involved in conflict interactions 
have to choose an optimal level of efforts or resources devoted to the 
unproductive activity of conflict. A significant element in economic theory of 
conflict is that investing resources in conflict is necessarily detrimental for 
welfare. This is central to theory of conflict as well as to theory of rent-seeking 
and contests. Given the partial-equilibrium framework adopted in this work, 
the analysis produced can be generalized to all these theoretical categories2. 
However, conflicts, contests and rent-seeking can be considered directly 
unproductive activities (DUP) in the spirit of the definition provided by 
Bhagwati (1982), who proposes a general taxonomy for a broader range of 
economic activities representing ways of making profit despite being directly 
unproductive. According to this view, such activities yield pecuniary returns 
but do not produce goods and services which enter a utility function, either 
                                                 
1 In more recent years several studies extended Hirshleifer’s basic model. See among others: 
Grossman (1991/1998), Skaperdas (1992), Garfinkel (1990/1994), Grossman and Kim (1995), 
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996/1997), Neary (1997a), Anderton et al. (1999), Anderton 
(1999/2000), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000), Alesina and Spolaore (2003/2005), Dixit 
(2004), Spolaore (2004), Caruso (2006).  
2 Outlining in depth the differences between contest, rent-seeking and conflict models goes far 
beyond the subject of this work. However, a few lines could suggest some interesting insights. 
The main differences between conflict models, rent-seeking, and contest models are that the 
former are generally general equilibrium models. This means that conflict models involve a 
trade-off between productive and unproductive activities and the prize (or the rent) of the 
contest is endogenous. The stake of the conflict is interpreted as a joint production which 
depends on the productive efforts of agents. At the same time, the cost function is represented 
by the foregone production. In such a construction the greater the number of the agents, the 
greater the ‘pie’ to be shared. In rent-seeking and contest models, the prize (or the rent) is 
given exogenously. In such a case, even if the number of contestants becomes larger the rent 
does not change. Moreover, rent-seeking and contest models can involve unconstrained 
optimization, whereas conflict models necessarily imply constrained optimization. Neary 
(1997b) and Hausken (2005) propose a comparison of conflict and contest models along these 
lines. Another point of interest in modelling conflicts is that it is often designed as being twice 
costly. In fact, in conflict agents can retain an ex-ante perception of losses. This is often 
formally captured through a destruction parameter (commonly bounded between zero and the 
unity). Two other remarkable points that would deserve a further deep attention are (i) 
voluntary participation (ii) the existence of a referee.  
directly or indirectly through increased production or availability to the 
economy of goods that enter a utility function. This is the rationale behind the 
labelling directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP). This paper is 
intended to extend the literature on this subject dealing with two main points: 
 
(i) the existence of a second type of effort (instrument) to win the 
conflict;  
(ii) an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake of the conflict.  
 
A story which immediately recalls the intuitions of this work is the story of 
The Good-Cop and Bad-Cop Game. Consider two cops arresting a suspect. 
Imagine also that they lack sufficient evidence to convict him. Then, they have 
to spend efforts in order to induce prisoners to confess. Next, as usually 
happens in American movies, in the questioning room cops have to play the 
good-cop and bad-cop game. The bad cop has to appear more aggressive, rude 
and less conciliatory. He would send exactly what students of strategy would 
define a ‘credible threat’. On the other hand, the good cop has to appear less 
rude and more conciliatory expounding the advantages of confessing. The 
Cops’ dilemma will be how much efforts in both behaviours should be spent. 
Of course, the outcome of questioning will depend upon the interdependent 
impact of complement instruments, rudeness and persuasion. On the other 
hand, the suspect has to choose whether to confess or to stick to his 
presumption of innocence. At the same time, and by sticking, the suspect can 
‘signal’ his or her willingness to cooperate through partial openings. 
This story highlights the existence of two interdependent instruments 
which can be used by rational agents in order to win a conflict. Analysing the 
realm of violent conflicts, it would be a great mistake to think of many 
conflicts as an exclusively violent activity. Most conflicts involve remarkable 
bargaining efforts between the antagonists. Beyond violence, as applied when 
sending actual or potential threats, agents are used to applying other 
instruments to successfully end the contest. During a war, for example, the 
exploitation of actual violence is often interlinked with diplomatic efforts. In 
international interactions the exploitation of potential  or actual violence 
cannot be disentangled from partial openings and cooperative behaviours. 
Diplomatic negotiations are often conducted while troops are deployed on the 
battlefield. This also does link with the famous idea of ‘carrot-and-stick’ 
strategy. 
In other words, it is reasonable to assume that agents can use different 
instruments in order to pursue their own maximum utility. Of course, any of 
the instruments used is interdependent with the others. Therefore, the outcome 
of the contest will arise from the interaction of such different instruments. In 
this view, the standard one-instrument models, commonly adopted in 
literature, can be considered as a special case of multi-instruments models. 
Therefore, the limiting assumption of this paper is that once involved 
in conflict interactions, agents face the option of choosing also a second 
instrument in order to improve the outcome of the conflict. Thus, in the 
continuation of this work I will refer to the second instrument as a complex 
bundle of Conflict Management Procedures (CMPs).  
A CMP can take different shapes. It can involve, among others, 
elements of communication, negotiation and signalling. Under the assumption 
of complete information, the second instrument must be perfectly observable. 
Thus,  
 
(i) the use of a second instrument needs not to be “payoff-irrelevant”: it 
must have a direct impact on both agents’ payoffs; 
(ii) the second instrument must also be costly. There is no room for 
cheap talk. In fact, what is needed is a “credibility –cost”. Under the 
assumption of complete information, an observable costly effort is 
assumed to be also credible; 
(iii) investment in conflict management must be irrevocable; 
(iv) the two instruments must be complements. 
 
In the theory of contest the use of a second instrument is not a novelty, 
although such approach has not been deeply developed.3 In particular, this 
paper is relative to a model proposed by Epstein and Hefeker (2003). They 
model a contest where, in order to win, each opponent can use two 
instruments. In such a model the use of two instruments is intended to improve 
each agent’s own performance. The authors show that the use of two 
instruments strengthens the player with the higher stake, decreases the relative 
rent dissipation and decreases total expenditure if the parties are sufficiently 
asymmetric. They interpret this second instrument as a complementary effort 
which might create an advantage for one of the opponents.  
As noted above, I will interpret the second instrument4 as a complex 
bundle of Conflict Management Procedures (hereafter CMPs for brevity). 
                                                 
3 Baik and Shogran (1995), study a contest between players with unknown relative ability. 
Under the assumption of decreasing aversion to uncertain ability agents are allowed to expend 
resources in order to reduce such uncertainty through spying. Konrad (2003), enriches a model 
of rent-seeking considering the interaction between two types of efforts: (i) the standard rent-
seeking efforts to improve their own performance in the view of winning a prize; (ii) a 
sabotaging effort in order to reduce the effectiveness of other agents’ efforts. In this model, 
sabotage is targeted towards a particular rival group and reduces this group’s performance. 
The point of interest is that through sabotage a group can increase its own probability of 
winning the prize as well as the other contestants’. Thus, the model predicts that sabotage 
disappears whenever the number of contestants becomes large. Caruso (2005b) presents two 
different models of contest with two instruments. The analysis is applied to sport contests in 
order to consider the phenomena of match-fixing and doping. Arbatskaya and Mialon (2005) 
analyse in depth the equilibrium properties of a two-instruments contest model and compare 
the results to those attainable in standard one-instrument models. 
4 I am aware that a simple objection would be related to the nature of this second instrument. It 
could be argued that in a conflict situation both opponents could choose whether to use or not 
two different types of bombs, grenades or other offensive devices. This could be true of 
course. However, this would relate to the dimension of the technology of conflict itself. In the 
Therefore, it would appear reasonable to distinguish between ‘pure conflict’ 
efforts and ‘conflict management’ efforts.  
However, it must be underlined that the two instruments are intended 
to be complements. Namely, the outcome of the conflict depends upon the 
mixed effect of violence and negotiation. This means that opponents do no 
give up their willingness to pursue the maximum possible payoff. Then, it 
would be interesting to verify whether, given the existence of conflict, agents 
can also retain an incentive to manage, and maybe to solve, it.   
The main goal presented in this paper will be represented by the 
identification of a Potential Settlement Region (hereafter PSR for brevity) as 
the set of possible peaceful agreements. The limiting hypothesis is that a 
settlement region is feasible if and only if both agents choose to negotiate, 
namely to expend efforts in the second instrument.  
This seems to be a quite realistic assumption. No settlement region 
appears to be feasible if one agent has no incentive to negotiate. In such a 
region, agents can reach an agreement but the model does not suggest whether 
they are likely to do it. One might say that this approach does fit more with the 
opportunity and incentives of opening talks or negotiations. This would imply 
that the existence of CMPs does not necessarily lead to a peaceful settlement 
but it is a characteristic feature of conflict itself. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in the first part the 
basic hypothesis and formal definitions are presented. In the second part, a 
basic model allowing for the second instrument is presented. The third part is 
focused on the issue of measurement. In particular, entropy is presented as an 
alternative tool for measurement of conflict and conflict management. In the 
following sections other extensions will deal with (a) the existence of an 
asymmetry in abilities; (b) the existence of a weighted sharing rule. Finally, 
the last section summarises the results and provides suggestions for future 
research. 
 
                                                                                                                                
literature of conflict, technological features of conflict are usually captured through a 
decisiveness parameter attached to the functional form of CSF adopted.  
II. The Basic Model 
There are two risk-neutral agents indexed by 21,=i . They conflict over a 
positive and divisible stake denoted by ( ) 2,1,,0 =∞∈ iX i . Agents are identical 
in abilities but at the same time they have different evaluations of the stake in 
the conflict. Then, it is possible to write that 2,1,,, =≠∀≠ jijiXX ji .  
Assuming a divisible stake clearly implies that this is not a winner-takes-all 
contest. The stake of the conflict can be interpreted in different ways. It might 
be for example a contested natural resource, a territory or a homogenous input. 
It is also assumed that the evaluation of the stake is different. In particular, 
agent 1 has a higher evaluation than agent 2. Let ( )10,∈δ  denote the degree 
of asymmetry between the stakes of the two agents, namely 
( ) 2 10,1 . .s t X Xδ δ∃ ∈ = . There is common knowledge about such hypotheses. 
Under the assumption of risk-neutrality, agents interpret the outcome 
of the non-cooperative conflict game as deterministic. That is, given the 
assumption of risk-neutrality agents are indifferent between conflict and 
sharing the stake in accordance with the winning probabilities. Then, the 
conflict is supposed to give each party control over a positive fraction of the 
contested stake in order to maximise its payoff. Let ( ) 2,1,,0 =∞∈ izi  denote 
the positive amount of violent efforts and [ ) 2,1,,0 =∞∈ ihi  denote the CMP 
efforts. 
The core assumption is that agents behave rationally and choose the 
elements of their strategy sets in order to maximize their own expected payoff. 
It is assumed that violence and appropriation constitute the first option for 
both agents. Hence, by means of comparative statics, agents will choose to use 
a second instrument if and only if the attainable payoffs will be greater than in 
the standard ‘one-instrument’ contest mechanism. In other words, here I also 
maintain that two different regimes can be studied. Under a first regime – say 
‘Pure Conflict’ – violent and appropriative efforts represent the only 
instrument, whereas under a second regime – say ‘Conflict Management’ – 
both agents can use both instruments. 
Let ti
o
i ππ ,  for 21,=i  denote the payoff achievable under the standard 
contest and the payoff achievable using the two instruments respectively. In 
particular, in their general form the payoff functions in general form can be 
written as 
),,,( jiji
o
i
o
i XXzzππ = and ( )jijijititi XXhhzz ,,,,,ππ = respectively. Then, 
each agent will choose to use the second instrument if and only if 
21,, => ioiti ππ .  
In the remainder of the paper, I will define it as Conflict Management 
Condition (CMC). Whenever it holds, it would be possible to say that a 
willingness to negotiate emerges. To summarise formally:  
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ =<⇔=>
=>⇔>>
2,100
2,100
ihz
ihz
o
i
T
iii
o
i
T
iii
ππ
ππ
    (c.1) 
 
In simpler words, agents will also choose the second instrument if – and only 
if – it reinforces the effect of the first instrument. That is, agents will devote 
resources to negotiations if and only if this behaviour appears to guarantee a 
higher payoff.  
As expounded above, I am interested in the case where both agents 
choose to use the second instrument. In this case there is room to identify a 
potential settlement region. Then, another limiting hypothesis is that a 
settlement region is feasible if and only if both agents choose to be involved in 
a CMP. This seems to be a quite realistic assumption. No settlement region is 
feasible if one agent has no incentive to negotiate.5 
To summarise, formally in the two-agents scenario, a PSR does exist if 
and only if: 
 
⎩⎨
⎧
>
>
oT
oT
22
11
ππ
ππ
        (c.2) 
 
Since according to (c.2) the payoff with two instruments must exceed the 
attainable payoff with only one instrument for both agents, this also means that 
there exists a positive value 21,, =−= ioiTii ππγ . Then, the PSR can be 
defined as the set of all the positive values6 for γ , 
namely ( ){ }jiiPSR iiji ≠=>>ℜ∈≡ ,,,,:, 2100 γγγγ .  
As noted above, a partial equilibrium model of conflict with an 
exogenous prize is not technically distinguishable from the standard rent-
seeking model. Thus, the cornerstone of this class of models is the Contest 
Success Function7 (hereafter CSF for brevity). In particular, the outcome of 
the conflict is determined through a CSF. It summarises the relevant aspects of 
                                                 
5 Note that such a condition is likely to hold in this limiting two-agents scenario. It is 
reasonable to think that in a n -agents scenario it might be relaxed.  
6 A more realistic assumption would imply a positive value, say ( )∞∈ ,0ε , such that the 
PSR can be defined as the set of all ( )εγ + . Whatever the arbitrary value chosen for ε , it 
would imply that negligible positive value for γ are ruled out. In other words, this means that 
each agent is willing to negotiate if and only if the difference between the expected payoffs is 
not negligible.  
7 The Contest Success Function is a mathematical relation that links the outcome of a contest 
and the efforts of the players. It is actually a founding pillar of many models. Selective 
seminal contributions are by Tullock (1980), O’Keeffe et al. (1984) and Rosen (1986). Dixit 
(1987) develops a general framework for contests using the general properties of logit 
functions. Hirshleifer (1989) focuses on a different form for the CSF: the ratio form and logit 
form. See then Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) for a basic axiomatization. 
what Hirshleifer defines the technology of conflict. In particular, even if the 
CSF can take different forms, the ratio form of the CSF8 is used here. 
 
i
i
i j
zp
z z
= +   for 21,=i and ij ≠     (1) 
 
Equation (1) is twice differentiable and follows the conditions below: 
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1 2
2 22 2
0,0 1/ 2
1
/ 0/ 0
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The functional form adopted in equation (1) implies that the conflict is not 
decisive, namely there is no preponderance of a party over the other. This is of 
course a limiting assumption, even if many conflicts fall in this category. 
Under the assumption of risk-neutrality the outcome of the CSF denotes the 
proportion of appropriation going to agent i for 2,1=i . Eventually, the payoff 
function is given by: 
 
ii
ji
io
i zXzz
z −+=π         (2) 
 
Each agent will maximise its own payoff with respect to its own level of 
violent efforts. This yields to the first order conditions: 
 
( ) jiizz zXz ji jii
o
i ≠==−+=∂
∂ ,,, 21012π     (3) 
 
Solving the first order condition, the equilibrium (denoted by stars 
superscripted) choices of violent efforts are given by:  
 
( ) jiiXX
XX
z
ji
jiO
i ≠=+= ;2,1,2
2
*      (4) 
 
In equilibrium the payoffs for agent i  are given by: 
                                                 
8 Hirshleifer (1989) analyses the different impact of two different function form for CSF: the 
ratio form and the logistic form. In the first case, the contest outcome depends upon the ratio 
of the efforts applied, whilst in the second case it depends upon the difference between the 
resources committed. 
 ( ) jiiXX X ji iOi ≠=+= ;2,1,2
3
*π      (5) 
 
Recall that 2 1X Xδ=  by assumption. Therefore, the agent with a higher 
evaluation of the stake of the conflict will arm more, namely OO zz ** 21 > . At the 
same time, payoff for agent 1 is greater than payoff for agent 2, namely 
* *
1 2
O Oπ π> . In other words, the agent with a higher evaluation of the stake in 
equilibrium is capable of getting a higher payoff by means of a higher level of 
violence. 
Plot 1 shows the relationship between the payoffs of both agents and 
the degree of asymmetry in evaluation of the stake (with an arbitrary value 
attached to the agent 1’s evaluation of the stake). As the asymmetry in 
evaluation decreases, the difference between the attainable payoffs decrease as 
well. Payoffs equal when there is no asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Investing in Conflict Management 
Consider now the option of a second instrument. Parties commit themselves to 
the use of a second instrument in order to affect the outcome of the contest. As 
mentioned above, the basic model presented hereafter follows and partly 
modifies the one proposed in Epstein and Hefeker (2003). The ordinary 
Contest Success Function is modified in order to allow for a second 
instrument. The two instruments are assumed to be complementary to each 
other. Then, the use of the second instrument would strengthen the effect of 
the first instrument. The CSF becomes: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
1
, , 1,2
1 1
ii
i
i i j j
z h
p i j i
z h z h
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Eventually, the payoff function for each agent becomes: 
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And follows the conditions below: 
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Also in this case, a Nash-Cournot behaviour for both agents is assumed. 
Therefore, each party maximizes its own payoff. The first order conditions for 
maximization are: 
 ( )( )( )( )( )
jii
zzzhzh
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h
zzzhzh
hhzX
z
jijjii
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Solving the four first order conditions for both agents yields the equilibrium 
level both for violent appropriation and CMP efforts: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
δ δ
δ δ
δ δ
δ δ
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T
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Note that 2,1,0* => iz Ti if and only if  
 ( )
2
22
1
10 δ
δ +>⇔> Xhi        (10) 
 
That is, in order to have a positive investment in conflict management 
the value of the stake must be relatively large. also note that the agent with a 
higher evaluation of the stake arms more than the opponent ( TT zz ** 21 > ). 
Another point of interest is that the difference of both instruments exactly 
equals. That is, in formal terms, **** 2121 hhzz
TT −=− . Then, in order to verify 
whether the critical points ( )* * * *1 2 1 2, , ,T Tz z h h represent a maximum it is possible to 
consider the Hessian matrices for both agents. In the appendix are reported the 
results.  The analysis shows that ( )* * * *1 2 1 2, , ,T Tz z h h  does constitute only a local 
max. 
Using also 21 XX δ= , the equilibrium payoff for both agents can be 
expressed in terms of 1X  and given by:  
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1 22
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T X Xδ δπ δ
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Given ( )1,0∈δ , it would be simple to verify that TT 21 ππ > . That is, the agent 
with a higher evaluation of the stake of the conflict is able to achieve a higher 
payoff. Consider agent 2’s payoff. Plot 2 clearly shows that there is a large 
range where agent 2’s payoffs turn negative. Plot 3 also shows that agent 2’ 
payoffs are higher than the opponent. In particular, look at some numerical 
examples presented in Table 1. It sheds light over the fact that agent 2 will 
have an incentive to expend efforts in the second efforts only when the 
asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake is really large. Otherwise, there is no 
room for investing resources in conflict management. Therefore, a potential 
settlement region is feasible only in the presence of a large asymmetry. In 
sum, it would be possible to write: 
 
Proposition 1: When agents are identical in abilities and retain different 
valuations of the stake, the agent with the lower evaluation will expend efforts 
in conflict management only when the asymmetry is extremely large. Only in 
such a case a potential settlement region can be established. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Payoffs 
    Pure Conflict 
Conflict 
Management 
1X  δ  1pcπ  2pcπ  1Tπ  2Tπ  
100 .10 83 0 98 1 
100 .15 76 0 94 1 
100 .20 69 1 90 0 
100 .25 64 1 84 0 
100 .30 59 2 78 -1 
100 .35 55 2 71 -2 
100 .40 51 3 63 -3 
100 .45 48 4 56 -4 
100 .50 44 6 49 -5 
100 .55 42 7 42 -6 
100 .60 39 8 36 -6 
100 .65 37 10 30 -7 
100 .70 35 12 24 -7 
100 .75 33 14 19 -7 
100 .80 31 16 14 -6 
100 .85 29 18 10 -5 
100 .90 28 20 7 -3 
100 .95 26 23 4 -1 
      
250 .10 207 0 244 1 
250 .15 189 1 235 0 
250 .20 174 1 223 -1 
250 .25 160 3 209 -2 
250 .30 148 4 192 -4 
250 .35 137 6 175 -6 
250 .40 128 8 157 -9 
250 .45 119 11 139 -12 
250 .50 111 14 121 -14 
250 .55 104 17 104 -16 
250 .60 98 21 88 -18 
250 .65 92 25 72 -19 
250 .70 87 30 58 -19 
250 .75 82 34 46 -18 
250 .80 77 40 34 -16 
250 .85 73 45 24 -13 
250 .90 69 50 15 -10 
250 .95 66 56 8 -5 
 
 
IV. Measuring Conflict through Statistical Entropy 
Conflict is susceptible to measurement. In the standard partial equilibrium 
contest theory the resources expended do constitute the social cost of contest. 
Then, recall the optimal choices of violent efforts. It would be possible to 
write that the total cost under pure conflict is given by: 
 
( )
( )
2
* *
1 2 12
1
1
oTC z z X
δ δ
δ
+= + = +       (14) 
 
Recalling (9) the total cost of contest when both agents expend efforts in a 
second instrument is given by: 
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2
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1
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δ δ
δ
⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟= + + + = −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
    (15) 
 
Define ( )( ) ( )22 21 / 1M δ δ δ= + + for compactness. Then, it is possible to write 
that T OTC TC>  for ( )1 2 /X M> .  
 Then a contest with two instruments would be more detrimental for 
welfare than a contest with only one instrument. It might be maintained that 
devoting resources to CMPs is wasteful and welfare-immiserizing. This result, 
of course, is sensitive to the functional form adopted. Hence, establishing a 
PSR would be welfare-immiserizing. In such a narrow sense, however, a pure 
conflict scenario would be paradoxically preferable. Establishing a PSR would 
be less efficient than pure conflict. The latter may seem a desirable scenario. 
Of course, this kind of conclusion would be sensitive to the modelling adopted 
but such a ‘positive’ impact would not be theoretically excluded from the start. 
It is clear that such a measurement could be unsatisfactory. The 
analysis needs to be carried further beyond. It would be also reasonable to 
identify a complementary measure for conflict and conflict management. An 
appealing idea for a more useful evaluation can be related to those of disorder 
and randomness. In fact, since conflict is a destructive interaction between two 
or more parties, it seems reasonable to consider also the degree of uncertainty 
it spreads. In actual violent appropriative conflicts uncertainty about the final 
outcome does clearly constitute a characteristic element that should be 
considered while developing devices to solve the conflict itself. 
The measure of uncertainty as the degree of disorder can be captured 
through the concept of entropy. In communication theory and physical 
sciences entropy is commonly adopted as a measure of the degree of disorder, 
uncertainty or randomness in a system.9 The famous reference is the work of 
                                                 
9 Consider among others some applications of entropy to social sciences: The Nobel graduate 
in physic Dennis Gabor in Gabor and Gabor (1958) applied entropy to the measurement of 
Shannon and Weaver (1949) which posed the quantitative foundations of 
information theory. In such a framework, entropy is defined as:  
 
1
1
( ,..., ) ln ,
n
n i i
i
E p p k p p
=
= − ∑       (16) 
 
where k is an arbitrary constant which can be set to unity without loss of 
generality.10 Note that, following the prevailing literature, ip can be interpreted 
in two different ways. First, it can represent a probability. Secondly, it can 
represent a share of some total quantity. Then, this flexible interpretation does 
fit well with the assumption of risk-neutrality and the following properties of 
the CSF.  
The greatest disorder would occur when all outcomes have the same 
probability, i.e. 1/ip n=  for 1,...i n= . The degree of disorder is given 
by: (1/ ,...,1/ ) lnE n n k n= . For instance, in the limiting case of 2n =  and 1k =  
the degree of disorder will be given by ln(2)E = . Then, consider the pure-
conflict case when agents use only one instrument. Thus, in such a case it 
would be simple to demonstrate that entropy is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )1 2
1 ln 1 ln
( , )
1
OE p p
δ δ δ δ
δ
+ + −= +      (17) 
 
Consider now the case of conflict management. In such a case the entropy is 
given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 2 2
1 2 2
1 ln 1 2 ln
,
1
TE p p
δ δ δ δ
δ
+ + −= +     (18) 
 
It would not be difficult to show that O TE E> for ( )0,1δ ∈ . This means that in 
presence of efforts devoted to conflict management the degree of disorder is 
lower. In particular, the point of interest is that as the asymmetry in evaluation 
decreases the degree of disorder and turbulence increases. This point sheds 
further light upon the results of the foregoing sections. It had been showed that 
as the asymmetry decreases, agents have no longer incentives to invest in any 
CMPs. Then, as the incentives to conflict increase the degree of disorder 
increases. In particular, as the degree of asymmetry approaches the unity, the 
difference in the degree of disorder decreases. 
                                                                                                                                
social and economic freedom. Entropy has been also proposed as a measure of 
competitiveness and diversification in market structure: see Attaran and Zwick (1989) and 
Horowitz and Horowitz (1968). 
10 The form adopted here is the one presented in Campiglio (1999), ch.4,  and Liossatos 
(2005). 
  
 
 
In order to refine better the use of entropy for measurement of conflicts it 
would be also useful to introduce the concept of relative entropy. Relative 
entropy is defined as the ratio of the actual to the maximum entropy in a 
system. Relative entropy does not give any information about the degree of 
disorder That is, it would be useful to recognize the extent to which the degree 
of disorder approaches the maximum level attainable. In formal terms it is 
possible to write the relative entropy as: / ( )RE E Ln n= . Then, relative entropy 
for pure conflict and conflict management respectively will be: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )1 2
1 ln 1 ln
( , )
1 ln(2)PC
oRE p p
δ δ δ δ
δ
+ + −= +     (19) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 2 2
1 2 2
1 ln 1 2 ln
,
1 ln(2)
CM
TRE p p
δ δ δ δ
δ
+ + −= +     (20) 
The relative entropy ratio would range from a value of zero for no entropy to a 
value of one when the maximum degree of entropy is attained.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 presents the calculations for entropy and relative entropy respectively. 
 
Table 2. Entropy and Relative Entropy 
       
    Pure Conflict   
Conflict 
Management 
Asymmetry in 
Evaluation   Entropy
Relative 
Entropy   Entropy 
Relative 
Entropy 
       
0.05  0.19 0.28  0.02 0.03 
0.15  0.39 0.56  0.11 0.15 
0.25  0.50 0.72  0.22 0.32 
0.35  0.57 0.83  0.34 0.50 
0.45  0.62 0.89  0.45 0.65 
0.55  0.65 0.94  0.54 0.78 
0.65  0.67 0.97  0.61 0.88 
0.75  0.68 0.99  0.65 0.94 
0.85  0.69 1  0.68 0.98 
0.95  0.69 1  0.69 1 
              
 
The figures clearly show that entropy is lower in the presence of CMPs. At the 
same time, it is worth noting that whenever agents expend resources in conflict 
management, the system fails to achieve its maximum possible degree of 
entropy at a relatively lower rate. In sum it would be possible to write: 
 
Proposition 2: When agents are asymmetrical in evaluation of the stake and 
identical in fighting abilities, the conflict management scenario appears to be 
less turbulent  than the  pure conflict scenario.  
 
Although entropy appears to be an appealing concept to evaluate 
conflicts and contests, some points should be highlighted. First, a remarkable 
point of interest which would deserve further attention is related exactly to the 
functional form of CSF adopted. In particular, if entropy is used as a measure 
of the degree of disorder it would be clear that it will depend directly upon (i) 
the technology of conflict; (ii) the number of contestants; (iii) the abilities of 
contestants; (iv) the consideration of a perceived ex-ante destruction parameter 
and (v) the existence of institutional constraints or noises. In other words, this 
also means that in partial equilibrium models the impact of incentives (that is 
the value of the contested stake) to conflict or to settle does not affect the 
degree of disorder.  
The result of this section also raises questions about a trade-off  
between the welfare losses and the degree of disorder. There could be 
equilibria where a lower degree of disorder could be attainable with a higher 
waste of resources. Consider for example the case of .15δ = . In such a case 
both (c.1) and (c.2) hold (that is a PSR can be established) and the degree of 
entropy is lower in conflict management scenario. However, the social waste 
of resources is higher than in pure conflict scenario. This simple consideration 
would represent a crucial point for a future research agenda. A trade-off 
between the wasting of resources and the degree of turbulence clearly 
emerges. 
A third necessary point in order to avoid a common misunderstanding 
is related to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. This states that the total 
entropy tends to increase over time approaching a maximum value. However, 
the Second Law of Thermodynamics holds only for isolated systems. Needless 
to say, any social or international conflict do not occur in an isolated system. It 
constantly interacts with the environment. Hence, the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics would not hold for conflict interactions. 
 
 
V. Heterogenous Abilities 
Up to this point I considered the simplest case never occurring in reality, 
namely two agents with identical abilities. Of course, in reality agents are 
heterogeneous. Then, in order to evaluate the impact of heterogenous abilities, 
let ( )0,a∈ ∞ denote a positive weight capturing the degree of asymmetry in 
abilities between contestants. It will enter the CSF which becomes: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
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az h z h
+= + + +      (21) 
 
It is clear that when ( )0,1a∈ , the first agent is less-endowed in abilities with 
respect to the opponent. When ( )1,a∈ ∞ , the first agent is more powerful and 
more endowed in abilities than agent two. When 1a = , the two agents are 
identical in abilities.  
Consider first the case of pure conflict. Then agents will use only the 
first instrument. The CSF reduces to: 
 
( ),
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i
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Eventually the payoff functions become: 
 
, 1,2
a i
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π = −+
≠ =
       (23) 
 
Using the ordinary process of maximization the equilibrium payoffs for the 
agents are: 
( )
2
1 12*
a a X
a
π δ= +        (24.1) 
( )
3
2 12*
a X
a
δπ δ= +                    (24.2) 
 
A first point of interest is that – differently from the simplest case – the agent 
with a higher evaluation of the stake does not always attain a higher payoff. In 
fact, it is possible to demonstrate that: 
 
* * 3/ 2
1 2
a a aπ π δ> ⇔ >        (25) 
 
since ( )0,1δ ∈ , it is clear that when 1a <  – namely, the agent with a higher 
evaluation of the stake is less endowed in fighting abilities – the agent with a 
lower evaluation of the stake is able to attain a higher payoff. Indeed, there is 
an ability effect counterbalancing the incentive effect which does depend upon 
the evaluation of the stake. 
 
Consider now the option for the second instrument. The payoff functions 
become now: 
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which follows the conditions presented in (7.1) and also: 
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The first order conditions for a maximum are given by: 
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Solving the four first order conditions for both agents yields the equilibrium 
level both for violent appropriation and CMP efforts: 
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Note that also in this case * 0, 1,2aiz i> =  and that:  
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that is, in order to have a positive effort in the second instrument it is 
necessary to have a relatively large value for the stake. Eventually the payoffs 
are given by: 
 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
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However, also in this case it is necessary to verify whether ( )1* * * *1 2 1 2, , ,z z h hπ  and 
( )* * * * *2 1 2 1 2, , ,a z z h hπ  constitute an optimum. Computations presented in the 
appendix show that (31) does constitute only a local max.  
 
Comparing the equilibrium level of agents’ payoffs it is possible to write that: 
 
* * 2
1 2
a a aπ π δ> ⇔ >        (32) 
 
that is the agent with a higher evaluation of the stake retains a higher level of 
payoff if and only if the degree of asymmetry in abilities is higher than a 
certain level. Otherwise, when agent 1 is not sufficiently endowed he will 
attain a lower payoff than the opponent. Also in this case, there is an ability 
effect counterbalancing the incentive effect which does depend upon the 
evaluation of the stake. Through a comparison of (25) and (30) it is worth 
noting that in pure conflict the condition allowing for higher payoffs accruing 
to agent 2 is stricter.  
 
As in the previous sections, to check for the existence of a PSR a comparison 
between equilibrium payoffs is needed. Then, recall (24) and (31). The plot 
below shows which area in the ( ),a δ  parameter space constitutes a PSR. That 
is, the graph shows areas where payoffs accruing to the agents under conflict 
management are greater than those attainable in a pure conflict scenario. All 
the points on the left of 2 2b b curve constitute a PSR. The points on the left of 
curve 1 1b b  would represent the region where the CMC condition hold only for 
agent 1.  
 In particular, it does appear clear that when agent 1 is less endowed in 
abilities (namely when 1a < ) the room for settlement is smaller compared with 
the case when agent 1 is more endowed in abilities.  
 
 
 
Due to the analytical complexity I present some numerical examples in the 
table below. Figures in bold denote the room for a PSR. It does appear that – 
ceteris paribus – when agent 1 is less endowed in abilities there is smaller 
room for a PSR. As agent 1 becomes stronger in abilities, the room for a PSR 
slightly enlarges. In sum it could be maintained: 
 
Proposition 3: When agents are asymmetrical both in evaluation of the stake 
and in fighting abilities then: whenever the agent with the higher evaluation of 
the stake is less endowed in fighting abilities there is a smaller room for a 
PSR.  
 
 
Table 3. Payoffs with asymmetrical abilities  
   Pure Conflict 
Conflict 
Management 
1X  δ  a  1aπ  2aπ  1aTπ  2aTπ  
100 .05 .3 73.5 0.1 98.5 1.0 
100 0.1 .3 56.3 0.6 91.5 0.7 
100 .15 .3 44.4 1.7 81.0 0.1 
100 .2 .3 36.0 3.2 68.5 -0.8 
100 .25 .3 29.8 5.2 55.2 -1.8 
100 .3 .3 25.0 7.5 42.4 -2.7 
100 .35 .3 21.3 10.1 30.8 -3.3 
100 .4 .3 18.4 13.1 20.8 -3.2 
100 .45 .3 16.0 16.2 12.6 -2.5 
100 .5 .3 14.1 19.5 6.0 -1.1 
100 .55 .3 12.5 23.0 0.8 1.1 
100 .6 .3 11.1 26.7 -3.1 4.0 
100 .65 3 10.0 30.4 -6.0 7.4 
100 .7 .3 9.0 34.3 -8.1 11.4 
100 .75 .3 8.2 38.3 -9.6 15.9 
100 .8 .3 7.4 42.3 -10.5 20.7 
100 .85 .3 6.8 46.4 -11.1 25.8 
100 .9 .3 6.3 50.6 -11.4 31.2 
100 .95 .3 5.8 54.9 -11.5 36.7 
       
100 0.05 0.9 89.75 0.01 100.17 0.99 
100 0.1 0.9 81.00 0.10 97.73 0.89 
100 0.15 0.9 73.47 0.31 93.80 0.65 
100 0.2 0.9 66.94 0.66 88.60 0.22 
100 0.25 0.9 61.25 1.18 82.36 -0.41 
100 0.3 0.9 56.25 1.88 75.38 -1.23 
100 0.35 0.9 51.84 2.74 67.93 -2.19 
100 0.4 0.9 47.93 3.79 60.27 -3.22 
100 0.45 0.9 44.44 5.00 52.65 -4.23 
100 0.5 0.9 41.33 6.38 45.23 -5.14 
100 0.55 0.9 38.53 7.91 38.19 -5.87 
100 0.6 0.9 36.00 9.60 31.61 -6.35 
100 0.65 0.9 33.71 11.43 25.57 -6.50 
100 0.7 0.9 31.64 13.40 20.10 -6.28 
100 0.75 0.9 29.75 15.50 15.20 -5.66 
100 0.8 0.9 28.03 17.72 10.87 -4.61 
100 0.85 0.9 26.45 20.05 7.07 -3.14 
100 0.9 0.9 25.00 22.50 3.77 -1.24 
100 0.95 0.9 23.67 25.05 0.93 1.07 
       
100 0.05 1.2 92.2 0.0 100.4 1.0 
100 0.1 1.2 85.2 0.1 98.5 0.9 
100 0.15 1.2 79.0 0.2 95.5 0.7 
100 0.2 1.2 73.5 0.4 91.5 0.4 
100 0.25 1.2 68.5 0.7 86.6 -0.1 
100 0.3 1.2 64.0 1.2 81.0 -0.8 
100 0.35 1.2 59.9 1.8 74.9 -1.6 
100 0.4 1.2 56.3 2.5 68.5 -2.6 
100 0.45 1.2 52.9 3.3 61.9 -3.6 
100 0.5 1.2 49.8 4.3 55.2 -4.6 
100 0.55 1.2 47.0 5.4 48.7 -5.6 
100 0.6 1.2 44.4 6.7 42.4 -6.5 
100 0.65 1.2 42.1 8.0 36.4 -7.1 
100 0.7 1.2 39.9 9.5 30.8 -7.5 
100 0.75 1.2 37.9 11.1 25.6 -7.7 
100 0.8 1.2 36.0 12.8 20.8 -7.5 
100 0.85 1.2 34.3 14.6 16.5 -6.9 
100 0.9 1.2 32.7 16.5 12.6 -6.0 
100 0.95 1.2 31.2 18.5 9.1 -4.8 
       
100 0.05 2 95.181 0.003 100.626 0.994 
100 0.1 2 90.703 0.023 99.512 0.951 
100 0.15 2 86.533 0.073 97.687 0.837 
100 0.2 2 82.645 0.165 95.195 0.623 
100 0.25 2 79.012 0.309 92.093 0.288 
100 0.3 2 75.614 0.510 88.452 -0.181 
100 0.35 2 72.431 0.776 84.352 -0.787 
100 0.4 2 69.444 1.111 79.875 -1.524 
100 0.45 2 66.639 1.518 75.108 -2.377 
100 0.5 2 64.000 2.000 70.136 -3.321 
100 0.55 2 61.515 2.559 65.038 -4.327 
100 0.6 2 59.172 3.195 59.891 -5.360 
100 0.65 2 56.960 3.911 54.762 -6.382 
100 0.7 2 54.870 4.705 49.709 -7.354 
100 0.75 2 52.893 5.579 44.783 -8.236 
100 0.8 2 51.020 6.531 40.027 -8.991 
100 0.85 2 49.246 7.561 35.471 -9.585 
100 0.9 2 47.562 8.668 31.141 -9.987 
100 0.95 2 45.964 9.852 27.055 -10.169 
 
 
Since the parameter enters directly the CSF, it is useful compute the degree of 
entropy. For sake of brevity I only report equations for relative entropy that 
are: 
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A point of interest is the level of entropy attainable in presence of asymmetry 
in fighting abilities. Differently from the scenario where agents were identical 
in abilities, it is possible to verify that a aCM PCRE RE>  for specific combinations 
of the given parameters. In particular, when the agent with the higher 
evaluation of the stake has a lower fighting ability (namely when 1a < ) the 
level of entropy is higher in the case of conflict management with respect to 
the pure conflict case when the asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake is not 
so large (see plot 7 and see figures in bold in the following table). 
 By contrast, when 1a > the pure conflict scenario is undoubtedly more 
turbulent than conflict management scenario. In the graph, area II contains all 
the points where a aPC CMRE RE> .  In other words, conflict management appears 
to lead to a less turbulent scenario even if there is a fighting preponderance of 
a party.    
 This result is not trivial and hardliners would not appreciate it. In fact, 
this contrasts the common belief according to which a power imbalance can 
lead to a more stable scenario where a party acquiesces to a credible threat 
sent by a stronger opponent. That is, a stable domination of one party over 
another does not seem to emerge. However, area II also contains points where 
1a < . In particular, it would be possible to show that the degree of entropy is 
greater in pure conflict if and only if 3/ 2a δ> . To enrich the meaning of this 
outcome, consider also that with 3/ 2a δ>  both agents would invest more in 
arms. However, results of table 3 show that there is no room for negotiating 
under those conditions. To summarise, it is possible to write: 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 4: When agents are asymmetrical both in evaluation of the stake 
and in fighting abilities, then: (i) when the agent with the higher evaluation of 
stake is also the more endowed in abilities the pure conflict scenario has 
always a greater degree of entropy than the conflict management scenario; (ii) 
when the agent with the higher evaluation of stake is also the less endowed in 
abilities, as the asymmetry in evaluation decreases, the conflict management 
scenario appears to be more turbulent than the pure conflict scenario. 
 
 
Table 4, Entropy and Relative Entropy with asymmetric abilities 
    Pure Conflict Conflict Managment 
Asymmetry 
in 
Evaluation 
Asymmetry 
in abilities Entropy  
Relative 
Entropy Entropy 
Relative 
Entropy 
      
.05 .25 .451 .650 .056 .080 
.25 .25 .693 1,000 .500 .722 
.5 .25 .637 .918 .693 1,000 
.75 .25 .562 .811 .617 .890 
.95 .25 .512 .738 .523 .755 
      
.05 .5 .305 .439 .031 .045 
.25 .5 .637 .918 .349 .503 
.5 .5 .693 1,000 .637 .918 
.75 .5 .673 .971 .691 .998 
.95 .5 .644 .929 .651 .940 
      
.05 1,5 .143 .206 .012 .018 
.25 1,5 .410 .592 .168 .242 
.5 1,5 .562 .811 .410 .592 
.75 1,5 .637 .918 .586 .845 
.95 1,5 .668 .963 .662 .955 
      
.05 2 .115 .165 .010 .014 
.25 2 .349 .503 .136 .196 
.5 2 .500 .722 .349 .503 
.75 2 .586 .845 .526 .759 
.95 2 .628 .907 .620 .894 
      
.05 4 .067 .096 .005 .008 
.25 4 .224 .323 .079 .115 
.5 4 .349 .503 .224 .323 
.75 4 .436 .629 .373 .539 
.95 4 .489 .705 .478 .689 
            
 
Finally, overlapping the graph and using as arbitrary value 1 100X =  it is 
possible to show that in correspondence of a PSR the efforts in conflict 
management lead also to a lower degree of entropy.  
 
 
 
 
 
VI. Destructive Conflict and Existence of a Sharing Rule 
This section introduces two extensions. First, conflict is supposed to be 
destructive, namely only a fraction of the contested stake will be attained by 
agents. In simpler words, agents are aware that the higher the level of violent 
efforts, the lower is the contestable stake. This is easier to understand in a 
general equilibrium framework. In such a case, since agents would be 
supposed to split their own resources endowment between ‘butter’ and ‘guns’, 
a destruction parameter denoted by ( )0,1β ∈  captures the expected foregone 
fraction of the positive stake due to the violent activity. In other words, as 
β increases, the conflict becomes less and less destructive. The destruction 
parameter can be interpreted as an ex-ante perceived evaluation of conflict 
losses. Both agents share the same perception of expected destruction. Albeit 
unrealistic, such a strict limiting assumption prevails in literature and, for 
analytical simplicity, I shall keep this throughout. 
Secondly, agents divide the stake according with a particular rule of 
division. In fact, following and extending Nitzan (1991), Garfinkel and 
Skaperdas (2000) and Caruso (2006) it is assumed that each agent’s share of 
the ‘pie’ will be a weighted combination of two possible rules: (i) the CSF and 
(ii) a symmetric split-of-surplus rule of division. The latter would correspond 
to the appropriate axiomatic outcome as indicated in bargaining literature. The 
relative weights are determined by the destruction parameter. According to 
this construction, the stake of the contest can be disposed in one of two ways: 
through conflict management or through a peaceful and predefined division. 
Then the payoff functions become: 
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the first order conditions for maximization are: 
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Solving the first order conditions and using ( )2 1, 0,1X Xδ δ= ∈ the optimal 
choices of both violent efforts and conflict management efforts are given by: 
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Eventually the payoffs accruing to the agents are: 
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However, also in this case it is necessary to verify whether ( )1* * * *1 2 1 2, , ,z z h hπ  and 
( )* * * * *2 1 2 1 2, , ,a z z h hπ  constitute an optimum. The computations presented in the 
appendix show that it does constitute a local max. (please see the appendix).  
 
Since ( )0,1δ ∈ , It is clear that * *1 2s sπ π> . The plot below shows the payoff 
accruing to the agents.  
 
 
 
As in the previous sections, through comparative statics it is possible to 
evaluate whether agents are willing to commit themselves to manage the 
conflict. In a pure conflict scenario equilibrium payoffs are:  
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1 12
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βπ δ
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       (40) 
 
Thus, according to the argument of this paper,  a PSR does exist if and only if: 
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As in the previous sections, consider an arbitrary value for the contested stake, 
namely 1 100X =  and use (41) and (42) as strict equalities. The plot below 
shows that a potential settlement region does exist. In particular, the PSR is 
given by the area under the curve 2 2a a .  
 
 
 
The plot clearly shows that a large PSR is feasible under some combinations 
of the destruction parameter and the degree of asymmetry in evaluation. The 
numerical examples presented in table 5 explicit this result. Once the 
destruction parameter is considered, agents clearly also take into account the 
opportunity cost of the conflict. That is, the perceived loss due the destructive 
interaction affects the optimal choice of both agents. Then, it favours an 
investment in conflict management in order to reach a peaceful settlement. 
However, there is a contrasting effect between the asymmetry in the 
evaluation of the stake and the destruction parameter. In particular, as the 
conflict is supposed to be less and less destructive, the room for a settlement 
vanishes. In sum, it would be possible to write: 
 
Proposition 5. if agents are asymmetric in evaluations of the stake and retain 
an equal ex-ante perceived evaluation of conflict losses, then (i) a potential 
settlement region does exist and it depends upon different combinations of 
perceived destruction and the asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake; (ii) as 
the conflict becomes less and less destructive, a potential settlement region is 
no longer feasible.  
 
Take into consideration the level of entropy. It does depend directly upon the 
mixed effect of both the level of asymmetry and the destruction parameter. For 
sake of brevity I only report equations for relative entropy that are: 
 
( ) ( )
( )1 2
1 ln ln
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( , ) .
1 ln(2)
o
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ββ δ δ δδ
δ
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1 ln 2 ln
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1 ln(2)
s
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ββ δ δ δδ
δ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠= − +    (44) 
 
Through a comparison of (43) and (44) it is clear that o sPC CMRE RE> . Namely, 
the conflict management scenario exhibits a lower level of turbulence. 
However, as δ  approaches to unity, the level of both entropy and relative 
entropy converge. As the conflict becomes less and less destructive the 
entropy reaches its maximum when the evaluations of the stake almost equal. 
In sum, 
 
Proposition 6. if agents are asymmetric in evaluations of the stake and retain 
an equal ex-ante perceived evaluation of conflict losses, then (i) the conflict 
management scenario appears to be less turbulent  than the  pure conflict 
scenario; (ii) as the conflict becomes less destructive the degree of entropy 
reaches its max when evaluation of the stake are slightly different.  
 
 
Table 5. Payoffs when Conflict is Destructive  
   Pure Conflict 
Conflict Management 
with sharing rule 
1X  δ  β  1oπ  2oπ  1sπ  2sπ  
      
100 0.05 0.3 27.21 0.00 66.79 3.76 
100 0.1 0.3 24.79 0.02 66.15 5.51 
100 0.15 0.3 22.68 0.08 65.14 7.25 
100 0.2 0.3 20.83 0.17 63.79 8.95 
100 0.25 0.3 19.20 0.30 62.17 10.62 
100 0.3 0.3 17.75 0.48 60.35 12.26 
100 0.35 0.3 16.46 0.71 58.41 13.87 
100 0.4 0.3 15.31 0.98 56.42 15.49 
100 0.45 0.3 14.27 1.30 54.44 17.13 
100 0.5 0.3 13.33 1.67 52.53 18.83 
100 0.55 0.3 12.49 2.08 50.73 20.59 
100 0.6 0.3 11.72 2.53 49.08 22.46 
100 0.65 0.3 11.02 3.03 47.61 24.45 
100 0.7 0.3 10.38 3.56 46.33 26.58 
100 0.75 0.3 9.80 4.13 45.26 28.86 
100 0.8 0.3 9.26 4.74 44.39 31.32 
100 0.85 0.3 8.77 5.38 43.74 33.96 
100 0.9 0.3 8.31 6.06 43.29 36.78 
       
100 0.05 0.5 45.35 0.01 76.64 3.25 
100 0.1 0.5 41.32 0.04 75.56 4.49 
100 0.15 0.5 37.81 0.13 73.84 5.68 
100 0.2 0.5 34.72 0.28 71.54 6.81 
100 0.25 0.5 32.00 0.50 68.78 7.86 
100 0.3 0.5 29.59 0.80 65.67 8.84 
100 0.35 0.5 27.43 1.18 62.34 9.78 
100 0.4 0.5 25.51 1.63 58.90 10.69 
100 0.45 0.5 23.78 2.17 55.47 11.63 
100 0.5 0.5 22.22 2.78 52.13 12.63 
100 0.55 0.5 20.81 3.46 48.95 13.72 
100 0.6 0.5 19.53 4.22 46.00 14.96 
100 0.65 0.5 18.37 5.04 43.32 16.38 
100 0.7 0.5 17.30 5.93 40.93 18.00 
100 0.75 0.5 16.33 6.89 38.84 19.85 
100 0.8 0.5 15.43 7.90 37.07 21.95 
100 0.85 0.5 14.61 8.97 35.61 24.31 
100 0.9 0.5 13.85 10.10 34.45 26.94 
       
100 0.05 0.9 81.63 0.01 96.34 2.25 
100 0.1 0.9 74.38 0.07 94.38 2.45 
100 0.15 0.9 68.05 0.23 91.24 2.56 
100 0.2 0.9 62.50 0.50 87.04 2.52 
100 0.25 0.9 57.60 0.90 82.00 2.34 
100 0.3 0.9 53.25 1.44 76.31 2.01 
100 0.35 0.9 49.38 2.12 70.20 1.58 
100 0.4 0.9 45.92 2.94 63.87 1.10 
100 0.45 0.9 42.81 3.90 57.53 0.62 
100 0.5 0.9 40.00 5.00 51.33 0.22 
100 0.55 0.9 37.46 6.23 45.40 -0.01 
100 0.6 0.9 35.16 7.59 39.84 -0.03 
100 0.65 0.9 33.06 9.08 34.73 0.24 
100 0.7 0.9 31.14 10.68 30.11 0.85 
100 0.75 0.9 29.39 12.40 26.01 1.83 
100 0.8 0.9 27.78 14.22 22.43 3.21 
100 0.85 0.9 26.30 16.15 19.35 5.01 
100 0.9 0.9 24.93 18.17 16.77 7.25 
 
 
 
Table 6. Entropy and Relative Entropy when Conflict is 
Destructive 
 
    Pure Conflict 
Destructive conflict 
with Sharing rule 
      
β  δ  Entropy
Relative 
Entropy Entropy 
Relative 
Entropy 
0.3 0.05 0.42 0.60 0.37 0.53 
0.3 0.1 0.45 0.65 0.38 0.55 
0.3 0.15 0.48 0.69 0.39 0.57 
0.3 0.2 0.50 0.72 0.41 0.59 
0.3 0.25 0.51 0.74 0.43 0.62 
0.3 0.3 0.52 0.75 0.45 0.64 
0.3 0.35 0.53 0.77 0.46 0.67 
0.3 0.4 0.54 0.78 0.48 0.69 
0.3 0.45 0.55 0.79 0.50 0.72 
0.3 0.5 0.55 0.80 0.51 0.74 
0.3 0.55 0.56 0.80 0.52 0.76 
0.3 0.6 0.56 0.81 0.53 0.77 
0.3 0.65 0.56 0.81 0.54 0.78 
0.3 0.7 0.56 0.81 0.55 0.80 
0.3 0.75 0.57 0.82 0.56 0.80 
0.3 0.8 0.57 0.82 0.56 0.81 
0.3 0.85 0.57 0.82 0.57 0.82 
0.3 0.9 0.57 0.82 0.57 0.82 
0.3 0.95 0.57 0.82 0.57 0.82 
0.3 1 0.57 0.82 0.57 0.82 
      
0.5 0.05 0.44 0.64 0.36 0.51 
0.5 0.1 0.50 0.72 0.37 0.54 
0.5 0.15 0.54 0.78 0.40 0.58 
0.5 0.2 0.57 0.83 0.43 0.62 
0.5 0.25 0.60 0.86 0.46 0.66 
0.5 0.3 0.62 0.89 0.49 0.71 
0.5 0.35 0.63 0.91 0.52 0.75 
0.5 0.4 0.65 0.93 0.55 0.79 
0.5 0.45 0.66 0.95 0.57 0.83 
0.5 0.5 0.66 0.96 0.60 0.86 
0.5 0.55 0.67 0.97 0.62 0.89 
0.5 0.6 0.68 0.98 0.64 0.92 
0.5 0.65 0.68 0.98 0.65 0.94 
0.5 0.7 0.69 0.99 0.66 0.96 
0.5 0.75 0.69 0.99 0.67 0.97 
0.5 0.8 0.69 1.00 0.68 0.98 
0.5 0.85 0.69 1.00 0.69 0.99 
0.5 0.9 0.69 1.00 0.69 1.00 
0.5 0.95 0.69 1.00 0.69 1.00 
      
0.9 0.05 0.27 0.39 0.11 0.16 
0.9 0.1 0.37 0.53 0.14 0.21 
0.9 0.15 0.44 0.64 0.19 0.27 
0.9 0.2 0.50 0.72 0.24 0.35 
0.9 0.25 0.55 0.79 0.30 0.43 
0.9 0.3 0.58 0.84 0.35 0.51 
0.9 0.35 0.61 0.88 0.41 0.58 
0.9 0.4 0.63 0.91 0.46 0.66 
0.9 0.45 0.65 0.94 0.50 0.73 
0.9 0.5 0.67 0.96 0.55 0.79 
0.9 0.55 0.68 0.98 0.58 0.84 
0.9 0.6 0.69 1.00 0.61 0.89 
0.9 0.65 0.70 1.01 0.64 0.93 
0.9 0.7 0.70 1.02 0.66 0.96 
0.9 0.75 0.71 1.02 0.68 0.99 
0.9 0.8 0.71 1.03 0.70 1.01 
0.9 0.85 0.72 1.03 0.71 1.02 
0.9 0.9 0.72 1.04 0.71 1.03 
0.9 0.95 0.72 1.04 0.72 1.04 
 
 
 
 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This paper analysed the incentives for risk-neutral agents of investing in 
conflict management in a contest under different conditions. Through 
comparative statics different scenarios have been studied. A Potential 
Settlement Region (PSR) is interpreted as the set of all positive differences 
between payoffs received in the alternative scenarios for both agents. 
First, the role of asymmetry in the evaluation of the contested stake has 
been underlined. When agents with identical abilities retain a different 
evaluation of the stake, the agent with the lower evaluation will expend efforts 
in conflict management only when the asymmetry is extremely large. Only in 
such a case a potential settlement region can be established. By contrast, when 
agents are asymmetrical both in evaluation of the stake and in fighting abilities 
there is a shrinkage of a PSR. In fact, whenever the agent with the higher 
evaluation of the stake is less endowed in fighting abilities there is a smaller 
room for a PSR. Once the destruction parameter is considered, agents clearly 
also take into account the opportunity cost of the conflict. That is, the 
perceived loss due the destructive interaction affects the optimal choice of 
both agents. Then, it favours an investment in conflict management in order to 
reach a peaceful settlement. In such a case, a PSR appeared to be extremely 
large while compared with those of the previous scenarios considered. 
As a novelty of this work, I would quote the use of concept of entropy 
as a tool for measurement of conflict. Following the common neoclassical 
approach,  investing in conflict management would be welfare-immiserizing. 
In such a narrow sense, however, a pure conflict would be preferable to a 
scenario where agents invest resources in conflict management. Establishing a 
PSR would be less efficient than pure conflict. An appealing idea for a more 
useful evaluation can be related to those of disorder and randomness. In fact, 
since conflict is a destructive interaction between two or more parties, it 
seemed to me reasonable to consider the degree of uncertainty it spreads. In 
actual violent appropriative conflicts uncertainty about the final outcome does 
clearly constitute a characteristic element that should be considered while 
developing devices to solve the conflict itself. It has been showed that the 
level of entropy also depends on the level of the asymmetry in the evaluation 
of the stake. In particular, the point of interest is that as the asymmetry in 
evaluation decreases the degree of disorder and turbulence increases. In 
particular, in presence of efforts devoted to conflict management the degree of 
disorder is lower.  
The discussion related to the concept of entropy recalls to mind the 
debate, famous among students of international relations during the Cold War, 
about the stability of systems grounded on deterrence. In such a view, 
deterrence would be a stable system thanks to the existence of a credible 
threat. The results of this paper firmly contrasts this idea. A threat system 
(namely the ‘pure conflict’ scenario) is more turbulent than ‘conflict 
management’ scenario. However, future research on this point could 
contribute to this enduring debate. 
The analysis paves the way for several extensions. In particular, 
remarkable points deserving further extension are the impact of a larger time 
horizon and the setting of a learning process. The model expounded in this 
work is a timeless model. Nevertheless, consider a possible application to a 
multi-period interaction. Assume for example that a dynamic interaction 
involves a learning process. Then imagine that such a learning process can 
modify the asymmetry in evaluation. Consider for example that valuations of 
the stake converge over time. Furthermore you can also imagine that some 
peculiar features of agents modify (consider among others: production 
function, access to market, investment in new technologies etc). In such a 
case, in a future period (say t n+ ), the asymmetry in evaluation can decrease, 
namely t n tδ δ+ > . In such a case a settlement could be no longer possible. 
Parties could prefer a pure conflict.11  
Moreover, for a future research agenda, consider that the CSF is used 
as a fundamental building block of several broader models. Applying the 
crucial modification of the CSF allowing for a second instrument can have an 
impact on the results emerging in these analyses. 
Last but not least, what I would also claim as a remarkable point of 
interest is the relationship with bargaining. The outcome of this work partly 
contrasts with Thomas Schelling’s famous statement according to which 
“conflict is a bargaining situation.” The results of the model show that 
conflict can evolve in a bargaining situation. It does if - and only if - some 
conditions are fulfilled. Specifically conditions (c.1) and (c.2) must hold. The 
first ensures that agents have an incentive to negotiate. The latter suggests that 
a bargaining space does exist when both agents spend efforts to negotiate. 
Even if conflict can be considered as an enduring situation it could be 
maintained that parties must have an adequate incentive to negotiate. 
Otherwise they can choose to spend their efforts only in violent means. Then, 
my interest in this story is that it also provides also information about how 
bargaining takes shape. In other words, bargaining cannot be taken for 
granted. This statement also can be considered a matter of perspective if you 
consider that hardliners are used to saying that bargaining arises only as a 
failure of conflict. Many still believe that perfect conflicts are something other 
than the exploitation of actual violence, or whatever destructive efforts.  
Finally, this line of theoretical analysis, which considers conflict and 
conflict management intertwined from the beginning, can have remarkable 
implications for the designing of economic policies in societies where conflict 
is a characteristic element. Consider for instance, the case of post-conflict 
societies, some LDC countries or mafia-infiltrated states.  
 
                                                 
11 See on this point the intuitions presented in Arrow (1995). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Throughout this appendix I shall check whether the critical points for a 
maximum computed constitute a global max, namely a NE. Thus, I have to 
check whether ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * *1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1, , , , , , , ,z z h h z z h h z h Aπ π≥ ∀ ∈  and 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1* * * * * *2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2, , , , , , , ,z z h h z z h h z h Aπ π≥ ∀ ∈ . 
 In order to check where the candidate critical points ( )* * * *1 2 1 2, , ,T Tz z h h represent a 
maximum it is useful to compute the Hessian matrices for both agents. Let me 
denote 1X X= and , 1, 2.Tiz z i= = for notational simplicity. First, I compute the 
payoff function for agent 1 ( )* *1 1 1 2 2, , ,z h z hπ . The payoff function becomes: 
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1 1
1 2 1
, , ,
2 1 1
z h X
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And the Hessian matrix is given by: 
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Note that the Hessian matrix is symmetric. Let 1kH denote the thk order leading 
principal submatrix of ( )* *1 1 2 1 2, , ,T TH z z h h  for 1,2k = . The determinant of the kth  
order leading principal minor of ( )* *1 1 2 1 2, , ,T TH z z h h  is denoted by 1kH . The 
leading principal minors alternate signs as follows: 
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Then I compute the payoff function for agent 2 ( )1 1* *2 2 2, , ,z h z hπ , 
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And the Hessian matrix is given by: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 2
2 2
2 2 2 2* *
2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
2 24 5 3 4 2 4 2 4 225 3 4 2
2 22
3 32 24 2 4 2 4 2 4 2
2 2 2 2
25 3 4 2 4 2 4
2
, , ,
2 1 2 1 12 1 2 1
2 1 1 2 1 1
2 1
z z h z
H z h z h
z h h h
X X z hX h
X z h X z h
X X z
π π
π π
δ δ δ δ δ δδ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ
∂ ∂⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎜ ⎟= =⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
⎡ ⎤+ + − + + ++ + + ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦−
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ + + + + + + +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦=
+ + − +( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
2 42 5 3 2 4 2
2 2
3 32 24 2 4 2 4 2 4 2
2 2 2 2
2 1 1 2 2 1
2 1 1 2 1 1
h X z
X z h X z h
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ δ δ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟+ + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ + + + + + + +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
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 Also in this case, let 2kH denote the thk order leading principal submatrix of ( )* *1 1 2 1 2, , ,H z z h h  for 1,2k = . The determinant of the kth  order leading principal 
minor of ( )* *2 1 2 1 2, , ,H z z h h  is denoted by 2kH . The leading principal minors 
alternate in sign as follows: 
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since the Hessian matrices are not negative semidefinite it is necessary to 
deepen the analysis in order to show whether the critical points ( )* * * *1 2 1 2, , ,T Tz z h h  
represent a global max. Then I compute the limits of both agents’ payoffs. For 
the first agent we have: 
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I do the same for agent 2. 
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therefore for both agents it is still necessary to check for 0, 1, 2ih i= = . Consider 
first the payoff function of agent 1: 
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the payoff is: 
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then, compare (11.1) and (9.11): 
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Due to the analytical complexity I present a plot in a ( ), Xδ space. The vertical 
axe corresponds to 1δ = . The shaded area in the plot below shows the region 
where the critical points ( )* * * *1 2 1 2, , ,T Tz z h h represent an optimum. 
 
 
 
for agent 2 we have: 
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compare (9.16) and (11.2) 
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also in this case consider the plot below: 
 
 
 
 
Then, it is clear that the critical points ( )* * * *1 2 1 2, , ,T Tz z h h do not constitute a global 
maximum, namely a nash equilibrium.   
 
Asymmetry in abilities 
To verify whether ( )* * * *1 2 1 2, , ,a a a az z h h  is an optimum also in this case I compute 
the payoff function for agent 1 ( )* *1 1 1 2 2, , ,z h z hπ . The payoff function becomes: 
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6 3
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The Hessian matrix for agent 1 is: 
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(29.2) 
 
 
The leading principal minors alternate signs as follows: 
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(29.3) 
 
These conditions say nothing abou whether or not any of these local extrema is 
a global max.  Then I compute the limits of agent 1’s  payoffs.  
 
 
 
(29.
4) 
 
therefore, it is still necessary to check for 0, 1, 2ih i= = . Consider the payoff 
function of agent 1: 
 
 
( ) ( )2
6 3
* *
1 1 2 14 3 2 2 4 6 2 8
1 1 1 1 1
, ,0,
4 6 4
a Xz z h X z
a z a z a z a X z z
δπ δ δ δ δ= − + −+ + + + +   
 (29.5) 
 
( )
( )( )
6 3 4 3 2 2 4 6 8
1
2
4 3 2 2 4 6 2 81
1 1 1 1 1
4 6 4
1 0
4 6 4
a X a a a a
z a z a z a z a X z z
δ δ δ δ δπ
δ δ δ δ
+ + + +∂ = − =∂ + + + + +
  
 (29.6) 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
( )
1/ 223 / 2 2 2 2 2 3/ 2 2 2 4
1 42
2 2X a a X a a a X
z
a
δ δ δ δ δ δ δ
δ
⎡ ⎤+ − − − + + − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦=
+
 (29.7) 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
1/ 223 / 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 3 2 3 5
1 42
2 2 4 6 1 4 2 1X a a X a a a a a X
a
δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ δ
π
δ
⎡ ⎤+ − − − − − + − + + − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦=
+
(29.7) 
 
Now compare (31) and (29.7) 
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First, it is possible to show that this inequality does not hold for X →∞ . 
Secondly, the plots below show the region when inequality (34.8) holds once 
attached different arbitrary values to X , namely when 
100, 200, 1000X X X= = = .  
 
 
 
 
 
In particular the shaded areas show when the critical points ( )* * * *1 2 1 2, , ,a a a az z h h represent an optimum for agent 1 in a ( ),aδ space.   
 
Destructive  Conflict and sharing rule 
To verify whether ( )* * * *1 2 1 2, , ,s s s sz z h h  is an optimum also in this case I compute 
the payoff function for agent 1 ( )* *1 1 1 2 2, , ,z h z hπ . The payoff function becomes: 
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The Hessian matrix for agent 1: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 1
1 1 1 1* *
1 1 1 2
1 1
1 1 1 1
4 44 3 6 3 2 2 6 2 223 6 3 2
1 11
3 34 42 6 2 2 2 6 2 2
1 1 1 1
4 43 6 3 2 2 6 2 2
1 1
, , ,
1 1 12 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
z z h z
H z h z h
z h h h
X X z hX h
X z h X z h
X X z h
π π
π π
β δ δ β δ δβ δ δ
β δ δ β δ δ
β δ δ β δ δ
∂ ∂⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎜ ⎟= =⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
⎡ ⎤+ − + ++ + ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦−
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ + + + + +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤+ − + +⎢⎣
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
43 6 3 2 2
1
3 34 42 6 2 2 2 6 2 2
1 1 1 1
2 1
1 1 1 1
X z
X z h X z h
β δ δ
β δ δ β δ δ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎥⎦⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ + + + + +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 
 
 
(37.2) 
 
The leading principal minors alternate in sign as follows: 
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These conditions say nothing about whether or not any of these local extrema 
is a global max.  Then I compute the limits of agent 1’s  payoffs.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(37.4) 
  
therefore, it is still necessary to check for 1 0h =  and 1 0z = . Consider the 
payoff function of agent 1: 
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Compare (37.8) and (38) 
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(37.9) 
 
the plots below show the region when inequality (37.9) holds once attached 
different arbitrary values to X , namely when 100, 200, 1000X X X= = = .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In particular the shaded areas show when the critical points ( )* * * *1 2 1 2, , ,s s s sz z h h represent an optimum for agent 1 in a ( ),δ β space.  It is clear 
that the critical points ( )* * * *1 2 1 2, , ,s sz z h h do not constitute a global maximum, 
namely a NE.   
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